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One of the charges that have most frequently been levelled at Marcus Tullius 
Cicero (106-43 B.C.) by contemporary readers is a supposed inability to work out 
an authentically original set of philosophical views1. In the opinion of many 
commentators, the exquisiteness of his oratorical style and the shrewdness he 
displayed in his political and forensic activity are not matched by equally 
remarkable achievements in the domain of theoretical reflection, especially when 
it comes to matters of political thought. Such a conviction might be fostered by a 
number of factors. In the first place, Cicero himself declared that there are many 
to whom he yields precedence in knowledge of philosophy, and that he could 
rather lay claim to the orator’s peculiar set of abilities (De Officiis I, 1.2). Also, his 
frequent and explicit reminders to the doctrines of thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, 
the Skeptics and the Stoics in his written works have often led scholars to charge 
him of mindless eclecticism. Most notably, his political views have often been 
judged in terms of a simple projection of his life and active commitments in the 
turbulent period of factional strife preceding the death of the Roman Republic, 
and not as stances substantiated by an authentic philosophical outlook. 
                                                 
1 See for instance V. Pöschl, Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero, Berlin, 
Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1936: 173, who sees Cicero’s political works (the Republic in 
particular) as depending heavily on the work of Plato. See also M.I. Finley (Politics in the 
Ancient World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983: 128) who deems Cicero’s work as 
lacking innovative aspects, both in the philosophical and in the historical sphere. More to the 
point, with regard to the Republic, he takes (in agreement with the German historian 
Mommsen) the central idea of the De Republica to be “as unphilosophical as unhistorical”. Cf. 
J.G. Powell (ed.), Cicero. The Philosopher, Oxford, Clarendon Paperbacks, 1999: 2-3. Powell, 
however, explains that the fact that Cicero was not a particularly original thinker makes him 
interesting in different respects. In particular, Cicero presents himself as “an attentive student 
of philosophy with a mind of his own, who could additionally bring to bear a wide experience of 
Roman life, politics and law, which was outside the normal purview of many contemporary 
Greek philosophers”.   
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This special issue of Ethics&Politics aims to shed a new light on Cicero as 
political thinker and to foster an appreciation of his thought by bringing into 
focus some of its main theoretical underpinnings. The general idea that inspires 
the collection of paper here collected is that Cicero’s voluminous corpus of writings 
allows the reader to trace the seeds of an authentically pioneering political theory, 
one that might give us insights into a network of key philosophical questions to 
which he seems to give pride of place: justice (iustitia), equity (equitas), the nature 
of the res publica and its most desirable internal arrangement (the best regime), 
the role of natural law and individual virtues in shaping the moral texture of the 
members of the societas humana.  
Cicero’s philosophical examination of the nature and purpose of politics is the 
result of a complex personal and professional path, which combines his dedication 
to literary and philosophical studies with his military, legal and political 
engagements. Cicero was born in 106 BC in Arpino in a rich family who belonged 
to the equestrian order; since his childhood he studied rhetoric, law and 
philosophy in Rome and then went on to study in Athens, Rhodi and Smyrna 
between 79 and 77 BC. Between 90 BC and 88 BC he is with the legati Gneus 
Pompeius Strabo and Lucius Cornelius Silla engaged in the “social war” fought by 
Rome and the Italic people who asked for Roman citizenship (which entitled them 
to many rights, such as access to public positions and the possibility to become a 
subject of ius civile). Some years afterwards he starts his activity as a lawyer and 
orator2. His official entrance in the legal arena is in 81 BC, when he delivers his 
first oration Pro Quinctio, although he becomes a famous orator only with the Pro 
Roscio Amerino3, delivered in defence of a citizen of Ameria accused of parricide. 
Cicero’s apprenticeship as a lawyer and orator in those days enables him to 
understand the functioning of Roman political institutions and to notice the 
incipient contrasts between optimates (who supported senatorial auctoritas and its 
hegemonic role in ancient Rome’s political life) and populares (who supported the 
sovereignty of people and the necessity to implement policies which favoured the 
people). These contrasts issue in a phase of civil wars raging from 86 BC (when the 
conflict between Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Marius deflagrates) up to the 
beginning of Augustus’ principality4.  
It is in such a historical context, characterized by a profound political and 
social instability, that Cicero’s cursus honorum develops starting from the year 75 
BC (when he became quaestor; he was then senator in 74, aedile curule in 69, 
praetor in 66 and consul in 63). In 60 BC Julius Caesar, Pompey and Crassus 
formed the First Triumvirate and took control of Roman politics. They tried to 
                                                 
2 For a study of Cicero forensic speeches as examples of practical advocacy see J. Powell and J. 
Paterson (eds.), Cicero the Advocate, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004.  
3 See Plutarch, Cicero 3,5. Cf. E. Rawson, Cicero. A Portrait, London, Allen Lane, 1975. 
4 For the historical context see G. Brizzi, Roma. Potere e Identità. Dalle origini alla nascita 
dell’impero cristiano, Bologna, Pàtron, 2012. 
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enrol Cicero on their side but he refused, stating that he preferred to remain loyal 
to the Senate and the Republic. This fact angered the triumviri and in 58 BC a 
satellite of Caesar, the tribune Clodius, proposed a retroactive law which 
sentenced to exile and to the loss of citizenship anyone who killed a Roman citizen 
without due trial. The law was devised against Cicero, who had Lucius Catilina 
killed without trial after denouncing his conspiracy in 63 BC. Cicero spent one and 
a half years away from Rome, mostly studying philosophy; after his return, being 
still forbidden to take part in politics, he wrote some of his major works. In 49 BC 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon and Cicero sided with Pompey, after whose defeat he 
was pardoned by Caesar, remained in Rome and wrote more works. After Caesar’s 
murder Cicero sided with Octavian against Mark Antony, but the two politicians 
found an agreement which included getting rid of their respective enemies. Cicero 
had attacked vehemently Antony, who had him killed in 43 BC.  
Beside his active political engagement, Cicero devoted his energy to the 
project of devising new ethical and political foundations to the Roman res publica, 
which in his days was waning to the point of disappearing. Cicero considered his 
reflections on politics an instrument to change the contemporary practical reality, 
the institutions of Rome and the mores of the Romans. He took the opportunity 
to write when he found himself excluded from active participation in politics and 
exiled from Rome. Works such as the De republica, the De legibus and the De 
officiis were written when Cicero was not institutionally engaged in politics and 
wanted to contribute to the regeneration of the republic. One of his main insights 
is the idea that, by identifying the theoretical reasons of the crisis of the republic, 
it is also possible to begin the process of renovating it through virtue. A 
comprehensive reflection on the entire institutional history of Rome enables him 
to identify the causes of the current situation and to meditate on the original link 
between knowledge of human nature and practical ends of human beings as well 
as the relation between human beings, god and final ends.  
By critically engaging with the reasons of the decline of the Roman republic, 
Cicero does not intend to confine himself to a theoretical work on politics but 
rather wants to contribute to a genuinely philosophical re-founding of Rome. He 
strives to find an ideal balance between conserving the traditional ethical and 
political traditions and modernizing the institutions of the Roman republic. He 
also pioneers a redefinition of the concept of optimus vir, who does not simply 
possess a generic ethical and intellectual virtue but can also face the new situation 
with a capacity for analysis and initiative5. Cicero ardently believes in the 
principle of Concordia ordinum, which he conceives as agreement and coordination 
between the senatorial and the equestrial orders; in a subsequent stage of his 
thought he thinks of a Concordia omnium bonorum, that is an agreement between 
                                                 
5 See E. Lepore, Il pensiero politico romano del I secolo, in A. Momigliano-A. Schiavone (ed.), 
Storia di Roma, Vol. II/1, Torino, Einaudi, 1990: 858.  
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all virtuous citizens in the name of a justice that enforces a real res populi (Cf. De 
republica 1.39): this is an agreement on the law which all citizens must respect 
(iuris consensu) in the name of the search for a common interest (utilitatis 
communio).   
This special issue is divided in two parts. The first part (titled “Anatomy of 
the Virtuous Res Publica: Law, Human Nature and Political Institutions in 
Cicero”), aims at identifying some central aspects of Cicero’s political thought by 
investigating such ethical issues as natural law, the mos maiorum and the virtue of 
the vir bonus. The second part (titled “The Modern and Contemporary Reception 
of Cicero”) explores Cicero’s legacy in the thought of some modern and 
contemporary authors.  
Notably, most studies on Cicero’s thought aim at reconstructing his vision of 
man and the res publica by investigating the philosophical sources of his main 
ideas. One of the most studied topics is Cicero’s vision of natural law, its origin 
and its implications on governing a republic. The notion of lex naturae has a 
central place in Cicero’s political thought, especially in the political projects of the 
De re publica and the De legibus. The first essay proposed in this collection of 
papers, La noción de ley natural en Cicerón by Francisco Lisi, opts for a different 
approach to this question from most interpreters, who trace the notion of natural 
law to a direct influence of Stoic philosophy Cicero6; Lisi, on the contrary, 
explores the possibility that the decisive influence on Cicero be Plato’s doctrines in 
the Republic and in the Laws. Lisi emphasises how Plato searches for a superior, 
transcendent grounding for his political constructions. The true universal law, or 
“reason in the universe”, is identified with the mind of the divine legislator. 
Cicero, according to Lisi, takes his bearings from Plato and maintains that the 
universal intrinsic in nature is converted into human law inside the man’s mind. 
Considering natural law as a set of rules founded on the equality of all human 
beings and valid everywhere, Lisi makes a fundamental conceptual distinction 
between the lex naturalis or naturae and the lex secundum naturam. The former is a 
law directly deriving from nature whereas the latter conforms to nature. This 
distinction between natural law and law according to nature is already present in 
Plato’s thought and Cicero tries to revive it and to adapt the Platonic model to 
historical circumstances of the Roman republic.  
 The issues of the fundamentals of “natural law” and the role played by such 
a concept in the De republica and in the De legibus are also addressed in the second 
essay proposed here, David Fott’s Skepticism about Natural Right in Cicero’s De 
republica, which moves from an accurate analysis of the characters in these 
dialogues and their respective positions. The very dialogical structure of these 
works is not just a homage to a literary convention but means to emphasise the 
                                                 
6 Some interpreters maintain that Cicero assimilated ideas from Antiochus of Ascalon, while 
others find in Philo of Alexandria, Antiochus’ former teacher, his main source of inspiration. 
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importance of dialectics and dialogue in searching for the truth about justice. In 
the De republica Cicero seems to enter an ideal dialogue with Philo, Laelius and 
Scipio, leaving the reader to wonder what is the position he embraces on the 
matter.  
Fott maintains that Cicero is actually quite sceptic both concerning the role of 
natural law and the question of who benefits from political activity (the rulers or 
the ruled?). Fott examines Cicero’s treatment of natural law in books I-III of the 
De republica and the three different positions maintained by the characters in the 
dialogue. The first speaker, Philo, denies the existence of a natural law inborn in 
men which can benefit all human beings. In his opinion, the real unwritten law 
prompts wise men to increase their wealth, to enjoy pleasures and to rule over 
other people even to their detriment. The second speaker, Laelius, has a positive 
view of natural law. He subscribes to the typical Stoic position and maintains that 
natural law, which is the “true law”, is according to nature, inborn in all human 
beings, eternal and based on God’s will. Against such notion is the third speaker, 
Scipio, who believes in the existence of a natural law but denies its divine origin. 
He focuses, rather, on its use and argues that virtue consists in the contemplation 
of what is eternal.  
Cicero’s positions concerning such fundamental topics as natural law, the 
destiny of man’s soul and the importance of political engagement are elaborated 
in a critical comparison to the doctrines of the most important Greek 
philosophers. In his Epicurean Philosophy in Cicero’s De Republica: Serious Threat 
or Convenient Foil?, Walter Englert explores the contribution of Epicurean 
philosophy in moulding Cicero’s view of nature and the ends of the virtuous man. 
Englert emphasises that Cicero’s approach to Epicurean philosophy was not 
hostile7, since in his childhood he befriended people like the Epicurean Phaedrus, 
who remained a lifetime friend. Nevertheless, in his writings (both philosophical 
and rhetorical and also in the letters) Cicero shows his disagreement with certain 
aspects of Epicurean philosophy. For instance, in the Somnium Scipionis he 
attacks the Epicureans for their criticism of Plato’s Myth of Er. More specifically, 
Englert contends, it seems that Cicero is arguing against a specific Epicurean, 
Colotes, who maintained the mortality of the soul. From a practical point of view, 
Cicero seems to believe that the members of the Roman political élites find a 
reason for not engaging in political activity in the Epicurean view of happiness as 
otium and ataraxia8.  
Cicero’s insistence on the risks entailed by a political life lacking the support 
of moral virtue may prompt the reader to inquire into the qualifying traits of the 
                                                 
7 For a different view see J.C.B Gosling and C.C.W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1982: 382-388. 
8 This idea was maintained both by Epicurus and by Lucretius, a philosopher by whom Cicero 
was fascinated, as he told his brother Quintus in a letter dated February 55 BC. 
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excellent man. In his essay Un dittico esemplare nel primo pensiero politico di 
Cicerone: Il comandante militare nella De Imperio Cn. Pompei (66 a.C.) e il 
governatore provinciale nella prima lettera al fratello quinto (59 a.C), François Prost 
examines two Ciceronian texts (an oration and a letter) which disclose an in fieri 
view of the virtuous man. Prost finds an early view on the nature of the virtuous 
man in the oration De imperio Cn. Pompei9, in which it is possible to see Cicero’s 
early political thought. His points of reference for the image of the good man in 
this work is Pompey himself; subsequently Cicero refined his ideas and included 
the experience of his own brother Quintus, who had important positions in the 
administration of Asia minor between 62 and 59 BC. 
Generally speaking, according to Prost, the portrait of the vir bonus has a 
double function: (i) a practical-strategic function, which consists in identifying a 
viable solution to the crisis at hand; (ii) an ‘exemplary’ function, namely that of 
suggesting a model for ruling in the interest of the State, respecting traditional 
institutions. The fundamental point for a virtuous man resides in a balance 
between the (ordinary and extraordinary) powers implicit in the ruler’s imperium 
and the moral virtues of the exceptional man, whose actions aim at the well-being 
of the State. More specifically, as it is testified by the Virtutes Pompei, military 
competence (scientia rei militaris) is less important than moral virtues, among 
which wisdom in decision (consilium in providendo), ingenuity (ingenium), 
temperance (temperantia) and humanitas stand out; this last virtue has a pre-
eminent role in Cicero’s ideal portrait of Pompey. The importance of humanitas, 
which is similar to the Greek ideal of philanthrôpia, is finally elaborated in Cicero’s 
first letter to his brother Quintus. By incorporating ideas of benevolence, justice 
and other-regardingness, humanitas represents a core value within a vast array of 
human excellences championed by authoritative men of old, i.e. men whose main 
concern was to convey a paradigm of justice and to encourage attitudes of respect 
for the common interest. Such excellences, which contribute to mould the kernel 
of the traditional morality of ancient Rome, generally come under the heading of 
mos maiorum.  
The notion of mos maiorum and its political significance are examined in Anna 
Iacoboni’s essay, titled Il significato politico del mos maiorum in Cicerone. Iacoboni 
shows how this notion is actually multifaceted, ranging from the moral to the 
legal sphere: it originates in a religious realm and then expands to the political 
sphere. In the ancient literary tradition mos maiorum is considered as a set of 
judgements and principles which issue in consuetudo. Mos originates from the 
principles which guide the actions of the maiores and – as certain writers (such as 
Varro) maintain – it becomes common consensus for all members of the political 
community. The custom of the forefathers has the same dignity as the leges, it has 
                                                 
9 This oration was delivered in support of Manilius’ proposal to replace Lucullus with Pompey 
in the war against Mitridates. 
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real legal validity, although it is founded only on orality and memory10 and is 
legitimized by its repeated application in time so that it becomes a constitutive 
part of ius. Iacoboni shows the resilience and flexibility of this notion, which 
evolves in time, and owes its political significance exactly to this characteristic. 
She finds the reason for its crisis in the social and economic transformations which 
followed the second Punich war, which brought great wealth into Rome and 
corrupted Roman mores, especially by generating a form of individualism which 
was unknown in the past. Cicero advocated the importance of philosophy in order 
to give new ethical content to the mos maiorum and in order to find a solution to 
the political crisis. He associates the mos maiorum to the notion of antiquum, 
which is not to be identified with a specific time in the past but rather with a 
proximity to divine perfection, which becomes the criterion of ethics. The appeal 
to the mos maiorum is used by the optimates to find in the tradition of their 
eminent maiores the legitimate foundation of their power in their struggle against 
the populares. 
The characteristic flexibility of the mos maiorum might prompt questions on 
the issue of the legitimacy of innovation in matters of morals. Lex Paulson’s 
essay, titled Conservative or Radical? The Constitutional Innovations of Cicero's De 
legibus, critically engages with the key aspects of the constitutional agenda set up 
by Cicero in his De legibus and proposes to answer the following questions: what 
are the theoretical and practical boundaries between innovation and attachment 
to traditional values in Cicero? Is there a theoretical framework in the light of 
which the innovations made in the constitutional project outlined in the De 
legibus may result compatible with the attachment frequently displayed by Cicero 
to the long-established institutional setting of the Roman republic? Paulson 
suggests that the compound of prescriptive ideals that inform the contents of the 
De legibus, by persisting against the backdrop of a declining res publica, provides 
the seeds for the development of a constitutional vision in which the inner 
tensions between innovation and preservation can be recomposed in compliance 
with the principle “to refresh the colours of the republican canvas” expounded in 
De republica 5.1.2 (and taken in its turn by a passage of Plato’s Laws, 769c). Like 
a painter being asked to reinvigorate the pale colors of a beautiful painting, the 
political man should renovate the original colors of the constitution while 
preserving its initial configuration.  
Cicero supplies a portrait of the virtuous constitution that, being inspired by 
the attempt to reconcile political realism and the search for an ideal perfection, 
turns out to be widely divergent not only from his own moral absolutism, but also 
from the Gracchi’s reformist solutions and the military realpolitik staged by 
leaders like Marius, Sylla, Pompeus and Caesar. Among the constitutional 
                                                 
10 For a detailed study of the mos maiorum see H. Rech, Mos maiorum; la tradizione a Roma, a 
cura di V. Vernole, Settimo Sigillo, Roma, 2006: 20. 
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innovations proposed by Cicero we find the introduction of new and enforced 
powers for the censors, of a senate with straightforwardly eligible members and of 
new sanctions against political violence. In the last analysis, Cicero’s political 
project appears to be grounded on the Senate’s authority and on the principle of 
the concordia ordinum11. The search for a balance between the various social and 
institutional components of the res publica finds its ground in strategic political 
measures designed to promote cooperation between the tribunate and the boni.  
By resting on the consensus of the good people, the concordia ordinum requires 
that political leaders be equipped with a distinctive set of interrelated virtues 
(both intellectual and ethical) and values able to mould a vision of the decent man 
and leader. As suggested in Colotte’s essay (Le De officiis: un manuel de vertu 
pratique?), such propensions and values are extensively illustrated in the De 
officiis. Written in the second half of the year 44 BC., the De Officiis – inspired by 
Panethius’ philosophy – may be considered Cicero’s philosophical testament, since 
it is written for his son Marcus, who was about to start his studies in Athens. The 
word officia, which is usually translated as “duties”, refers to the Stoic notion of 
καθήκοντα, what is appropriate, what one has to do, in other words to the duties 
of the honest man. Colotte’s essay aims at examining not only the moral and 
political perspectives of the honestum in Cicero – considered with respect to the 
Stoic morality – but also at investigating the relation between these theories and 
Cicero’s own political action. The central question of the De officiis is: how, in a 
“real” situation, i.e. one necessarily complex and impossible to be fully controlled, 
can one make a decision that proves not only useful and practical, but also moral 
and universally paradigmatic? Colotte’s contention is that, on Cicero’s view, there 
is a specific, ideal that succeeds in reconciling claims for universal moral validity 
with the idea of an appropriateness grounded in the contingency of situations: the 
honestum.  
The honestum, as it is described in the first book of the De officiis, has four 
parts: in order to quench our thirst for knowledge (veri cognitio), there is wisdom; 
to orient our social activity there is justice (justitia); to appease our desire of 
independence and domination there is courage (fortis animus et magnus) and to 
satisfy our love for order and harmony there is temperance (decorum = 
temperantia, verecundia, modestia). To these four domains of morality correspond 
four cardinal virtues, which are critically examined by Cicero. 
By grounding his view on a philosophy of action and on a concept of practical 
virtue, Cicero explores the conditions for a “just action”, considered in the usual 
situations of the life of a man who wishes to hold a high responsibility in the 
administration of the State. In Cicero’s thought, the search for “the right thing to 
do” finds expression not only in an investigation of strategies of political conduct 
                                                 
11 For a study on the principle of the concordia ordinum see H. Strasburger, Concordia ordinum, 
Eine Untesuchung zur Politik Ciceros, Bern, 1931, repr. Amsterdam, Hackert, 1956.  
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suitable to specific circumstances, but – at a more general level – also in the 
attempt to answer the question of the best life to live. An exploration of the issue 
of the most preferable life conducted in the light of the Ciceronian notion of 
officium is provided by Arianna Fermani in her essay Tra vita contemplativa e vita 
attiva: Il De officiis di Cicerone e le sue radici aristoteliche. As Fermani maintains, 
the concept of officium seems to retain the semantic potentialities of the Greek 
ergon, and evokes the idea of a human “function” that can be exercised according 
to sapientia and prudentia. Such virtues, in Cicero as well as in Aristotle, prove 
capable to bring the distinctive potentialities of human beings to a full-fledged 
realization, either in the direction of a life of contemplation or towards a practical 
and political life. On Fermani’s view, Cicero attempts to develop exquisitely 
Aristotelian insights12 so as to convey the idea that nature itself constitutes a 
prescriptive principle for human beings, one that encourages them to root their 
natural inclination in a well-thought path of human perfection. 
So conceived, nature reveals itself as a source of assessment of human agency 
and, most importantly, as an inspiring principle for the life-choices of individuals. 
At any rate, Cicero does not establish a full axiological equivalence between 
theoretical and practical interests in human life. On his view, primacy ought to be 
accorded to political life over an existence purely (or mostly) devoted to the 
pursuit of philosophical speculation. Above all, theoretical activity should not be 
understood as an alternative to the political, but as one able to shape virtuous and 
efficient plans of action. An analysis of the interactions between the two and the 
corresponding kinds of life is offered by Gastaldi in her Vita politica e vita filosofica 
nei proemi del De republica di Cicerone. Gastaldi makes use of the three proems of 
the De republica as a privileged observation point with respect to a variety of 
issues, such as the relationships between theoretical and practical life (ranging 
from difference up to complementarity), the axiological primacy held by practical 
life with respect to the contemplative one, and the most suitable strategy to 
identify concrete political problems and engage with them13. As Gastaldi points 
out, Cicero addresses a fierce criticism against those (like Epicureans and the 
Stoics) who held a departure from political life to be the precondition for a happy 
life. Cicero invites his readers not to follow such philosophers as paradigmatic role-
models, and suggests them to express devotion to the city, which ought to be 
regarded as a nurturing mother. On his view, the opposition between the 
philosophical and the practical life staged by other theorists should be overcome 
by the ideal of theoretically wise men committed to political science. Also, 
                                                 
12 On the topic of Aristotle’s influence on Cicero see for instance W.W. Fortenbaugh and P. 
Steinmetz (eds.), Cicero’s Knowledge of the Peripatos, New Brunswick and London, Rutgers 
University Studies in Classical Humanities, 1989. See also O. Gigon, ‘Cicero und Aristoteles’, 
Hermes 87 (1959): 143-162. 
13 For a study of the issue of the relationships between practical and contemplative activity in 
the proems cf. A. Grilli, I proemi del De republica di Cicerone, Brescia, Paideia, 1970. 
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Gastaldi holds, Cicero shows special appreciation towards those philosophers who, 
although never straightforwardly engaging with political activity, handle the 
issue of political science from a purely theoretical point of view. In this respect, 
Cicero seems to follow the path of Panetius, who endorses the importance of a 
commitment to political activity informed by the philosophical knowledge of 
human nature. When understood in this way, the figure of the wise man stops 
being detached from the social and political dimension. 
A different stance on the relationships between contemplative and practical 
life is offered by Schütrumpf in his Cicero’s View on the Merits of a Practical Life in 
De republica 1 - What is Missing? A Comparison with Plato and Aristotle. 
Schütrumpf suggests that Cicero seems to endorse a “strong” view of engagement 
in political life, that is, one according to which those intellectuals who devote 
themselves to a theoretical study of politics cannot be regarded themselves as 
actively involved in the field. As Schütrumpf argues, Cicero criticizes Plato for 
failing to show the risks entailed by a political reflection unable to end up in 
concrete agency. Schütrumpf’s approach emphasizes aspects of divergence 
between Cicero and Plato, especially with reference to the model of practical 
philosophy avenged by Plato’s Socrates in the Gorgias. Being charged by Callicles 
with avoiding the public arena, Socrates replies by presenting himself as a true 
politician in virtue of his dialogical activity with young people interested in 
apprehending virtue (Gorg. 485d3-e2). Cicero critically confronts with the 
paradigm of relationship between philosophy and politics exemplified by the 
Platonic Socrates, that is, the one in which politics finds an expression in 
pedagogical action, and opts for a more vigourous model of practical life: one that 
exhalts the virtue and the specific identity of individual beings and their 
excellence, the latter encompassing their military skills and gestae. By so doing, 
Cicero rejects the idea that philosophy can be a form of politics, and his De 
republica, in this respect, can be read as philosophical counterpart of Plato’s 
Republic. 
A more reconciling perspective between Cicero and the ancients is instead 
suggested by Havlíček, whose essay sheds light on the positive role that Greek 
philosophy has played on the shaping of Cicero’s thought. Havlicek holds that 
there are two different ways of understanding the relationship between politics 
and philosophy: on the one hand, to consider politics as an activity able to exert a 
true monopoly over an intrinsically valuable philosophic speculation; on the 
other, to suppose that a relationship of reciprocal collaboration can subsist 
between politics and philosophy, being exemplified in its most complete form in 
the nature of the optimus civis. Although in De republica 3.6 Cicero has expressed 
the axiological priority of politics over philosophy, his works (in particular the 
Tusculanae Disputationes) present some significative passages in which philosophy 
is praised for its capacity to invite individuals to the pursuit of self-knowledge, 
and not necessarily for its practico-political implications. Plato and Aristotle’s 
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influence would be predominant here. In particular Cicero would acquire the 
meaning of “common good” and the image of a city in which politicians do not 
prioritize their own interest. The criticism addressed to Plato would not lead 
Cicero to totally denty the role that philosophy can have in practical life, even 
though the latter has primacy over speculation. In the last analysis, Havlíček 
maintains that a correct understanding of Cicero’ thought ought not identify a 
rupture between philosophy and politics, but rather trace a fundamental 
interdependence between the two aspects, so suggesting a philosophic-dialectical 
foundation of politics itself.  
 
The second part of this special issue focuses on Cicero’s intellectual legacy and 
on the intersections between his thought and that of modern and contemporary 
thinkers. The contributions in this section deal with the relation between ancient 
and modern in two different ways: firstly, by showing how Cicero’s thought had a 
seminal role in modern and contemporary authors; secondly, by suggesting how 
contemporary philosophy can improve our understanding of Cicero’s thought and 
of his philosophical premises. In his essay Giovanni Giorgini (Cicero and 
Machiavelli: Two Visions of Statesmanship and Two Educational Projects 
Compared)  moves from the consideration that it is impossible to overestimate the 
importance of Cicero’s writings or his historical significance as an example in 
politics and in rhetoric for Italian Humanist and Renaissance culture. 
Machiavelli, well-educated in the classics, drew from Cicero the inspiration for 
embarking on a project of education of a new ruling class: Machiavelli’s “principe 
nuovo” is new when compared to his contemporary counterparts, imbued with 
Christian and Humanist notions of virtue; however, the “principe nuovo” has an 
old soul, since the new notion of prudence elaborated by Machiavelli has its roots 
in classical images of ethical and political virtue, in Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. 
Machiavelli, just like Cicero, felt that what he had not been able to do in deeds 
with his political action at the service of the Florentine republic, he could do 
through his writings: putting his knowledge of men and politics, his expertise 
gained through practical experience and constant reading of ancient authors at 
the service of his fellow-countrymen and of his patria. The novelty of 
Machiavelli’s teaching consists in advocating a new kind of prudence, which 
consists in the capacity to do evil in view of a good and elevated purpose: to save, 
preserve and aggrandize the State.  In a similar vein, Fausto Pagnotta (in his 
Cicerone nell’opera e nel pensiero politico di Machiavelli: alcune considerazioni 
introduttive) compares and contrasts Cicero and Machiavelli in order to show 
similarities and dissimilarities between the two authors. The influence of Cicero in 
Machiavelli’s works is most clear in the Prince and in the Discourses. Both authors 
are considered homines novi, since their political success was not due to their 
belonging to the aristocratic class but rather to their ability to have connections 
with many diverse people in power. Pagnotta maintains that for Cicero the 
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distinctive trait of human beings is their capacity to realize their rational nature 
in a path which emancipates them from their original animal origins. Cicero’s own 
writings have a pedagogical and educational purpose, since they aim at promoting 
a renewal of roam society and of its ruling class starting with the young 
generations. For Cicero sentiments such as liberality, love for the country, piety 
“have their source in the fact that we are by mature inclined to love human 
beings” (Leg. 1, 43); Machiavelli seems to adopt a completely different approach, 
for he maintains that by nature men are “more prone to evil tan to good” (Disc. I, 
IX, 8). His realism and his anthropological pessimism prompt him to find efficient 
and durable for the conservation and stability of political power, without the 
ambition to create a virtuous character in the “classical” sense.   
Besides general analogies between ancient and modern thinkers, there are 
some key concepts of modern European political thought whose development is 
influenced by Cicero’s political doctrines. One of these concepts is the “sovereignty 
of the people”, upon which Neschke focuses her attention (in her essay Il 
contributo di Cicerone alla nascita della dottrina moderna della “sovranità del 
popolo”). The author emphasises that the modern idea of sovereignty of the 
people, founded on the idea that a people is composed of rational individuals, is 
not medieval and is rather the result of the secularization of the political realm of 
the XVII century. This concept, which originated in Catholic political theory 
before and after the Council of Trento, is forcefully defended by the neo-scholastic 
author Francisco Suarez against the king of England, James I, who defended the 
idea that the king represents God’s power on earth without intermediaries. 
Neschke shows that Suarez’s notion of the sovereignty of the people is not derived 
from Catholic doctrines but rather from Cicero’s republicanism. Against James’ 
idea that the people is unable to get together by itself, and it is the king’s duty to 
unify it thanks to his individual will, Suarez advances a revolutionary doctrine for 
his times: the political community is autonomous in its decisions already before 
the creation of a sovereign power, for it is not a physical body without head, as 
James thought, nor a shapeless entity which needs to be moulded by regal power, 
as Vitoria maintained. According to Suarez the people is a moral person capable of 
making decisions through a will which is already unified even before electing a 
government, to which the original power is transferred in order to reach the 
highest good. Neschke maintains that Suarez adopts the Stoic doctrine used by 
Cicero according to which all human beings are equal, endowed with reason and 
capable of living in harmony. Suarez takes very seriously Cicero’s view that the 
“populus” is composed of rational individuals who want political justice and who 
reason in order to attain the common good; as such the people is created through 
consensus, without the intervention of a unifying external element – as Vitoria 
and Bellarmino had argued.  
Cicero’s contribution to shaping the intellectual development of  modern 
thinkers and active politicians is also explored by Martelli and Tossani in La 
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Retorica del tradimento. Pensiero e technē ciceroniano nell'orazione di Saint-Just il 13 
Novembre 1792. More to the point, the two authors explore the role Cicero’s works 
had in of  Saint-Just. They maintain that there is a direct influence which emerges 
at two different levels: the first level is that of  the conceptual framework, both 
concerning the legal and the political aspects of  institutions; the second is that of  
the literary style. The discourses delivered at the Convention on November 13th 
and on December 22, 1792, are the most explicit examples of  this re-elaboration 
and adaptation of  Cicero’s thought to the revolutionary context. France had 
legally and in point of  fact become a republic but it still had a king, who was not 
trusted by the nation. During the trial for high treason held by the National 
Convention against the king, Saint-Just offered a revolutionary justification 
against the idea that a sovereign power could not be tried in court. In his opinion, 
Louis XVI was guilty not according to the loi civile, i.e. the Constitution of  1791, 
which provided immunity to the king, but only in front of  a higher form of  right, 
namely the Droit des gens. St Just observes that there formally is a sort of  political 
contract between king and nation, as the republic itself  reiterated, but this 
contract is voided by the fact that it does not prescribe any duty to the king. 
Instead, the relation between rulers and ruled must be founded on mutual 
acknowledgment of  moral and political authority; in emphasising this fact, St 
Just appeals to Cicero’s republicanism, from whom he gets the idea that absolute 
monarchy degenerates in a tyrannical power legally unaccountable. Saint-Just 
even uses rhetorical devices and compares Louis to Catilina, and underplays the 
notion of  regicide through the example of  Caesar.  
A coexistence of rhetorical and philosophical influences of Cicero’s works can 
also be traced in American modern political thought. In her essay Americanus sum 
nec quidquam Americani a me alienum esse puto. I classici latini e la nuova identità 
statunitense in John Adams, Elena Tosi examines the role that Cicero had at the 
end of the Eighteenth century in the intellectual formation of one of the founding 
fathers of American democracy, John Adams, second president of the United 
States of America. Cicero’s influence can be traced at three different levels. There 
is first an influence on Adams’ literary style, which can be noticed in his letters 
and political discourses. Cicero’s letters Ad Familiares and his rhetorical 
techniques inspired Adams in his activity as a lawyer. Secondly, Cicero affected 
profoundly Adams’ political thought to the point that he believed that the 
Roman res publica was an example to replicate in the US. Adams is particularly 
interested in Cicero’s notion of natural law, in his view of decency and honour and 
in his ideal of civil concord to be achieved through the pursuit of a common good 
by all citizens. Indeed, Adams finds in Cicero’s ideal of iustitia the criterion for 
distinguishing between a good government and a tyranny. Finally, Adams himself 
can be considered a homo novus, since he is foreign to any “inherited greatness” 
received from the ancestors. These two elements of “individual initiative” and 
refusal to appeal to ancestral nobility are the distinctive traits of the modern 
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concept of “self-made man”. In the last phase of his life Adams, just like Cicero, 
wrote letters that showed his disillusion towards his political experience: here 
Adams’ philosophical model seems to be the Cato Maior de Senectute.     
The last contribution of this section is by Elena Irrera, who uses 
contemporary philosophical concepts in order to shed light on a rather unexplored 
aspect of Cicero’s thought: the nature of respect. Irrera investigates the question 
using the conceptual framework developed by Stephen Darwall in his studies on 
respect. Darwall identifies four kinds of respect: (1) a form of respect as 
appreciation of the moral excellence of a specific individual; (2) respect as 
acknowledgement of specific forms of technical knowledge which make his owner 
an authority in his field; 3) respect as reverence for individuals or entities 
considered socially or ontologically superior as compared to the respecting subject; 
4) a form of equal respect for people who mutually recognize as moral agents. 
Through an analysis of passages in the De republica, the De legibus and the De 
officiis, the author shows that the forms of respect conceptualized by Darwall are 
already present in Cicero’s text, where together they substantiate new forms of 
respectful attitude. The first type of respect that can be found in Cicero’s texts is a 
form of emulative esteem for the moral and intellectual excellence of someone. Of 
particular interest is the concept of asymmetrical respect conceived as “honour”, 
which has its foundation in the ideal of aequabilitas – an attitude of respect 
proportionate to the social standing of each individual– and in the activity of 
“cultivating” the object of respect – expressed by the Latin verb colere. Finally, 
Irrera maintains that some of Cicero’s arguments concerning justice and the 
common good disclose an early notion of equal respect which neglects the social 
and professional standing of individuals. Cicero illustrates this form of respect 
through the originally asymmetric concept of reverence, which becomes then part 
of the notion of reciprocity.   
In conclusion, the two editors hope that the essays here published give a sense 
of the rich debate which occurred during the two days of conference in Bologna 
and of the current lines of research concerning the thought of Cicero. 
 
This monographic issue of Ethics & Politics contains papers delivered on the 
occasion of an international conference entitled Rethinking Cicero as Political 
Philosopher, which took place at the University of Bologna on May 30th and 31st, 
2013. The conference, the 13th general meeting, was part of the activities organized 
by the Collegium Politicum, a thematic network composed by different 
universities and research centers, whose main objectives are the study of classical 
political theory and its reception in the history of the political thought, especially 
its repercussions in Modern Europe. By bringing together a wide range of 
competences and approaches, the meeting provided scholars and students from 
different countries with an opportunity for a stimulating exchange of ideas on 
Cicero’s political thought, with particular reference to his understanding of the 
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idea of political commitment and its philosophical underpinnings. The variety of 
interpretive strategies displayed by the speakers articulated the steps of an 
intellectual itinerary that attempted, on the one hand, to supply a reconstruction 
of Cicero’s original ideas and of the cultural background in which these found a 
chance to flourish, and, on the other, to test the theoretical import of such ideas in 
modern and contemporary political philosophy. In this issue we shall endeavor to 
outline some of the key passages of such an itinerary, touching upon questions like 
the origin and implications of natural law, the nature of the best constitution and 
Cicero’s critical engagement with ancient Greek philosophers. As the reader will 
notice, the collection of essays proposed here does not pretend to offer conclusive 
answers to some questions raised by Cicero scholars, but rather sets the stage for 
further explorations, in the full spirit of a critical enquiry constantly open to 
theoretical challenges and contaminations with present times.  
In line with the tradition of events organized by the Collegium Politicum, we 
have decided to accord contributors the freedom to write their papers in the 
language of their choice. Also, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by an 
on-line publication, we left the authors free to develop their arguments with no 
restraints in terms of length of their essays. Sadly, among the papers presented in 
this issue, one has not been revised by its author: Professor Ada Neschke-
Hentschke, one of the founding members of the Collegium Politicum, passed away 
just a few weeks after the conference. Professor Neschke-Hentschke gave us the 
text of her communication in Italian, written in a provisional form. We have 
decided to publish it and to make corrections only to the Italian form and not to 
the content. Professor Neschke-Hentschke did not only have the original idea of 
creating a network of scholars interested in classical political thought and its 
revival in the modern and contemporary age but also greatly contributed to the 
establishment, enlargement and institutionalization of the Collegium Politicum. 
Ada will be greatly missed by all members of the Collegium Politicum both as a 
great scholar and as an extremely kind person. It is to her loving memory and to 
her commitment to the philosophical life that we dedicate this collection of papers 
on Cicero.  
Many are the debts of gratitude we have incurred both during the 
organization of the conference and in the preparation of this issue. We would like 
to thank Professor Ermanno Malaspina for his invaluable help in the scientific 
organization of the colloquium. Our gratitude also goes to the Comune di Bologna 
and the Biblioteca dell’Archiginnasio for granting us the use of the Stabat Mater 
room for the inaugural day of the colloquium, which provided us with a beautiful 
and congenial location for a discussion of Cicero’s imperishable political works. 
Many thanks also to the chancellor of the University of Bologna, Professor Ivano 
Dionigi, for his support and for his rich and erudite inaugural address. Many 
thanks to the School of Political Science, and its President Professor Daniela 
Giannetti, for hosting us during the second day of the colloquium in its beautiful 
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lecture rooms. Many thanks also to the Director of the Department of Political 
and Social Sciences, Professor Fabio Giusberti, for his support in all phases of the 
conference. We would like to thank all the participants to the colloquium for their 
contribution to the success of this event and for allowing us to publish their 
papers.  
 
